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INTRODUCTION
War is conflict between nations or states car-
ried on by force of considerable duration and 
magnitude, by land, sea, or air for obtaining 
superiority and dominion of one over the other. 
War has been a topic of analysis and researchers 
for some time. F. W. Lanchester (1916, 1956) 
originally published his mathematical model 
for air to air combat in his 1916 book, Aircraft 
in Warfare. These models known as the linear 
and square law became the basis for much of the 
analysis of combat. These differential equations 
models have been the methodology to present 
and solve many historical combat models. 
Both Bonder’s (1981) and Dolansky’s (1964) 
articles discussed the importance of Lanchester 
equations in modeling combat. James G. Taylor 
(1983) alluded to difficulties in solving more 
difficult “realistic” equations and suggested 
numerical methods that can easily and conve-
niently be numerically solved on a computer. 
The use of computers to analytically solve or 
numerically solve combat models is the standard 
method. We suggest using discrete dynamical 
system (difference equations) as the discrete 
form of Lanchester’s equations in our combat 
models. We show the discrete forms and their 
analytical solutions, where applicable. We also 
show both numerical and graphical solutions to 
historical conflicts. We compare one of these 
solutions with the differential equation form to 
show how closely the discrete form matches the 
differential equation solution. We also suggest 
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uses of these discrete equations in more modern 
combat models with insurgencies and counter-
insurgencies. These models may be used to assist 
decision making for our nation’s leaders.
DISCRETE FORMS OF 
laNCHESTER’S EqUaTIONS
History is filled with examples of the unparal-
leled heroism and complexities of war. Specific 
battles like Bunker Hill, the Alamo, Gettysburg, 
Little Big Horn, Iwo Jima, the Battle of Britain, 
and the Battle of the Bulge are a part of our 
culture and heritage. Campaigns like the Cuban 
Revolution, Vietnam, Panama, and now the 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are a part of 
our personal history. Powers (2008) and Fox 
(2008) have suggested that we can model the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) conflict with 
Lanchester’s equations.
Although combat is fought over continuous 
time, there are typically discrete starting, pause, 
and stopping points. Often models of combat 
employ discrete time simulation. For years, 
Lanchester’s differential equation models were 
the norm for computer simulations of combat. 
The diagram of simple combat as modeled 
by Lanchester is illustrated in Figure 1. We 
investigate and illustrate the use of a discrete 
version of these discrete equations. We use 
models of discrete dynamical systems via dif-
ference equations to model conflicts and gain 
insights by examining the models of “directed 
fire” historic conflicts such as Nelson’s Battle at 
Trafalgar, the Alamo, and Iwo Jima. We employ 
difference equations that allow for a complete 
numerical and graphical solution to be analyzed 
and do not require the mathematical rigor of 
differential equations. We further investigate the 
analytical form of the “direct fire” solutions to 
provide a solution template, where applicable, 
to be used in modeling efforts.
Lanchester’s equations stated that “under 
conditions of modern warfare” that combat 
between two homogeneous forces could be 
modeled from the state condition of a similar 
diagram (Taylor, 1980). We will call this state 
diagram (Figure 1), the change diagram.
We will use the paradigm, Future = Present 
+ Change, to build our mathematical models 
using discrete dynamical systems. This will be 
paramount as eventually models will be built 
that cannot be solved analytically but can be 
analyzed by numerical (iteration) methods 
and graphs.
We begin by defining the following vari-
ables:
x(n) = the number of combatants in the X-force 
after period n.
y(n) = the number of combatants in the Y-force 
after period n.
Figure 1. Change diagram of combat modeled by Lanchester
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The future state is then x(n+1) and y(n+1), 
respectively.
Thus, we have using our paradigm,
x(n+1) = x(n) + Change
y(n+1)=y(n) + Change.
Figure 1 provides the information that 
reflects change. Our dynamical system of 
equations is:
x(n+1) = x(n) –k1y(n)  (1)
y(n+1) = y(n) –k2x(n) 
We define our starting conditions as the 
size of the combatant forces at time period zero: 
x(0)=x0 and y(0)=y0.
Dynamical systems can always be solved 
by iteration, which make them quite attrac-
tive for use in both computer modeling and 
simulations of combat. However, we can gain 
some powerful insights with those discrete 
equations that have analytical solutions. This 
particular dynamical system of equations for 
Lanchester’s direct fire model does have an 
analytical solution.
aNalYTICal SOlUTIONS 
FOR DISCRETE FORM OF 
laNCHESTER’S DIRECT 
FIRE EqUaTIONS
We return to this system of equations as 
Lanchester’s direct fire equations in difference 
equation form, equation (1):
x n x n k y n
y n k x n y n
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
+ = -














































We will use the matrix solution method 
using eigenvalues and eigenvectors to find the 
analytical solution of equation (2). Further, we 
will characterize the solution we found in terms 
of only k1, k2, x0, and y0. This is significant as 
we can quickly write the solution to this form 
of Lanchester’s equation modeled as in equa-
tion (2).
Let’s begin by defining eigenvectors and 
eigenvalues:
Let A be a n n´  matrix. The real number 
l  is called an eigenvalue of A if there exists a 
nonzero vector x in Rn  such that
Ax x= l .  (3)
The nonzero vector x is called an eigenvec-
tor of A associated with the eigenvalue, l .
Equation (3) is written as,
Ax x or A I x- = - =l l0 0, ( ) , 
where I is a 2 x 2 identity matrix. The solution 
to finding λ comes from taking the determinant 
of the (A-λI) matrix, setting it equal to zero, and 
solving for λ.




















We set up the matrix (A-λI) to find the 
























This yields the characteristic equation,
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We solve for λ. Although not intuitively 













Therefore, we have the eigenvalues from 
the initial form of the equation. We note that 
the eigenvalues are a function of the kill rates, 
k1 and k2. If you know the kill rates then you 
can easily obtain the two eigenvalues.
We also note two other characteristics of 
the eigenvalues:
(1) l l1 2 2+ =  and (2) l l1 2³ .
For most of these combat models one 
eigenvalue will be > 1 and the other eigen-
value will be < 1. The equation whose being 
attrited by the larger value of k1 or k2 has the 
eigenvalue, λ >1.
The general form of the solution for the 
size of the force x after any general discrete 
time period t, called x(t), is as follows:
x t cV cVt t( ) ( ) ( )= +
1 1 1 2 2 2
l l ,  (5)
where the vectors V1 and V2 are the correspond-
ing eigenvectors.
These eigenvectors, interestingly enough, 
can be simplified into a ratio of the attrition 
coefficients, k1 & k2. The vector for the domi-
nant eigenvalue always has both a positive and 
a negative component as its eigenvector while 
the vector for the other smaller of the two 
eigenvalues always has two positive entries in 
this same ratio. This is because the equation for 
finding the eigenvector comes from:
k k v k v and k k d k d
or
v k v k k and d k d
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2
0 0- = - - =
= = = - =, , k k
1 2  
 (6)
Having simplified formulas for obtain-
ing eigenvalues and eigenvectors allows us to 
quickly obtain the general form of the analytical 
solution. We can then use the initial conditions 
to obtain the particular solution.
In terms of our parameters of the model, we 



































































RED aND BlUE FORCE 
IllUSTRaTIVE EXaMPlE
For example, consider a battle between a Red 
force, R(n), and a Blue force, B(n), as given 
below:
B n B n R n B
R n R n B n R
( ) ( ) . ( ), ( )
( ) ( ) . ( ), ( )
+ = - × =
+ = - × =
1 0 1 0 100
1 0 05 0 50  









2= = . 
We are given the attrition coefficients, k1 
= -0.1 and k2 =-0.050.
Using the formulas that we just presented, 
we can quickly obtain the analytical solution.
k k
1 2
0 1 0 05 0 0707= - ×- =. . . . 
We use equation (4) to obtain the two 
eigenvalues of our combat model. They are 
1.0707 and 0.9293. We build the closed form 
analytical solution with the ratio of the vectors 
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Our general solution would be:























( . )0 9293 t
 
With our initial conditions of (100, 50) 
at time period 0, we solve for the particular 
solution to obtain:
X t t( ) .
.





















( . )0 9293 t  
We can decompose this into the blue and 
red equations:
B(t) = 14.64 (1.0707)t + 85.36 (0.9293)t
R(t) = -10.35(1.0707)t + 60.35 (0.9293)t
We plot these together in Figure 2 and 
we observe the behavior illustrating that Blue 
wins.
These two graphs of the analytical solu-
tions for the Blue and Red forces show that 
after about 12.5 time periods the Red force 
(initially at size 50) approaches 0 and the Blue 
force (initially at 100) is slightly below 70. 
Thus, we know the Blue force wins and the 
Red force is annihilated.
We can also develop a relationship 
for this “win” and quickly see that when 
k k B k R
1 2 1
0 0× > ×( ) ( )  then the Blue force 
wins.
F o r  o u r  e x a m p l e ,  w e  f i n d 
k k B and k R
1 2 1
0 0× ×( ) ( ) .
B k k
k R
( ) . .
( ) . .
. .
0 100 0 0707 7 07
0 01 50 5 0
7 07 5 0
1 2
2
× = × =
× = × =
>
 
Since 7.07 is greater than 5.0 then the Blue 
force wins.
In general, the relationship can be either 
<, =, or >. So, we state that
Figure 2. Solution plots for B(t) and R(t) showing Blue wins
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k k B k R
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When the relationship is greater than (>) 
then Blue wins, when the relationship is less 
than (<) Red wins, and when the relationship 
is equality (=) then we have a draw.
DEFINING PaRITY
The concept of parity in combat modeling is 
important. We define parity as a fight to finish 
that ends in a draw—neither side wins. We as-
sume that under the conditions of parity that both 
sides annihilate themselves (mathematically 
they both go to zero). No side wins and both 
sides lose. Mathematically, the parity condition 
is the easiest to solve and then examine if slight 
changes can be made in our favor. We can find 
parity by either manipulating one of the four 
parameters {x0, y0, k1, or k2} and hold the other 
three as constants. These four parameters are 
the initial conditions, x0 or y0, and the attrition 
coefficients k1 or k2.
Again the knowledge of the solution is 
critical to finding or obtaining these parity 
values. It turns out under parity that the eigen-





















































Let’s return to our example and assume 
that Blue force starts with 100 combatants and 
the Red force with 50 combatants. Recall that 
Blue wins the engagement. Further let’s fix k2 
at 0.05. What value is required for k1 so that 
the red force fights to a draw?
We find ( . ) ( ) ( )0 05 100 50
1 1
k k= ×
Thus, k1 = 0.20. This means that the Red 
force must kill the Blue force at a rate twice as 
great as their current rate (k1 was 0.1) in order 
to obtain a draw.
If Blue starts with 100 soldiers and the 
kill rates are fixed, how many soldiers would 
Red need? We find that the R force needs 70.71 
combatants to obtain a draw. This is a 41.42% 
increase in combatants for Red.
We are not only able to quickly determine 
who wins the engagement but we can also find 
values that allow both sides to fight to a draw. 
This is important because any deviation away 
from the parity values allows for one side to 
win the engagement. This helps a force that 
could be facing defeat to either increase their 
force enough to win or obtain better weaponry 
to improve their kill rates enough to win.
qUalITaTIVE aND 
qUaNTITaTIVE aPPROaCH
We develop a few qualitative insights with 




X X n X n kY
Y Y n Y n k X
= + - = -
= + - = -
( ) ( )






We set both equal to zero and solve for the 
equations that make both equal to 0. This yields 
two lines x=0 and y=0 that intersect at (0,0) the 
equilibrium point. Vectors point toward (0,0) but 
analysis shows that the equilibrium value (0,0) 
is not stable. Our assumptions imply trajectories 
terminates when it reaches either coordinate axis 
indicating one variable has gone to zero. Figures 
3 and 4 illustrate the vectors and the then the 
regions where the curves result in wins for the 
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X force and in wins for the Y force, or in a draw 
(the solid line through the origin).
Recall our parity form allowing x0 to replace 
B(0) and y0 to replace R(0) in equation (8): 
k k x k y
1 2 0 1 0
× = × . We simplify and solve for 
y. This yields a straight line through the origin 






Along this line we have a draw where both 
sides go to zero, parity. Above this line, we have 
the region where y wins and below we have the 
Figure 3. Equilibrium value (0,0) for the Direct Fire Model
Figure 4. Trajectories for the basic Direct Fire Model illustrating X wins
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region where x wins. We plot our solution for 
y versus x and it shows in the next figure that 
we are in the region where y wins.
IllUSTRaTIVE “DIRECT 
FIRE” HISTORIC EXaMPlES
Let us use the discrete Lanchester equations 
and the relationships developed to investigate 
some historic examples.
THE BaTTlE OF THE alaMO
First, consider the situation at the Alamo. Ac-
cording to some models created by Thompson 
(1989), Teague (2005), and Hercilla-Heredia 
(2008b), approximately 189 Texans were bar-
ricaded in the Alamo, being attacked by ap-
proximately 3000 Mexicans in the open fields 
surrounding it. We are interested in describing 
the loss of combatants in each force over the 
course of the engagement. We will do this by 
measuring or defining change. We define T(n) 
to be the number of Texans after period n and 
M(n) to be the number of Mexican solders 
after time period n. That is, we want to devise 
a way to express future = present + change 
as T n T n T( ) ( )+ = +1 D  (where DT is 
the loss of Texan combatants over time) and 
M n M n M( ) ( )+ = +1 D  (where DM is the 
loss of Mexican combatants over time). The 
Battle of the Alamo is illustrated as an example 
of a “directed fire” battle. The combatants on 
each side can see their opponents and can direct 
their fire at them. The Texans hiding behind the 
barricades were the more difficult target, and we 
need to have our models reflect this fact.
First, consider DM .  This depends 
on the number of bullets being fired by 
the Texan defenders and how accurate-
ly they are being fired at the Mexican 
army. We can use a proportionality model, 
DM number of bullets probability of hit
probability kill p
µ ( )× ( )×
( | robability hit).
The number of bullets capable of being 
fired depends on how many men are firing and 
how rapidly each can fire. Given the weaponry 
at the time, it might be more effective to have 
only a portion of the combatants firing with 
the rest reloading the rifles for them. This 
might increase the intensity of fire. There is 
also an issue of what portion of the force is in 
Figure 5. Mexican army approaching the Alamo
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a position to fire on the enemy as well as what 
portion of the force is exposed to direct fire. If 
the enemy force is in a rectangular formation, 
with several lines of combatants one behind 
the other, only the first one or two rows may 
be capable of firing freely at the enemy. Thus, 
DM Texans firing bullets Texan
prob hit bullet
= ( )× ( )× ( ) ×
( )
% / / min
/ × ( )Mexicans disabled hit/
All of these variables can be combined 
into a single proportionality constant k1. Some 
of these variables will vary over distance or 
time. For example, the probability of a hit will 
likely increase as the Mexican army closes in 
on the Alamo. However, our model assumes 
each of these entries, except for the number of 
combatants, is constant over the course of the 
battle. Consequently, we can write change term 
as: DM k T n= -
1
( ) , where T(n) is the number 
of Texans remaining in the battle after period 
n. The negative sign indicates the number of 
Mexican combatants is decreasing.
Now, consider DT.  It is similarly com-
posed of terms like the number of Mexicans, 
percent firing, number of bullets per Mexican 
combatant per minute, the probability of a hit, 
and the number of Texans disabled per hit. 
According to Teague (2005), we would expect 
that the rate of fire for the Mexican army to 
be smaller than the Texans, since they will be 
reloading while marching instead of reloading 
while standing still. Similarly, the probabil-
ity of a hit will also be higher for the Texans 
shooting from a stance behind a wall than for 
the Mexicans shooting while marching in the 
open fields. Thus,
 
1 ( )M k T n∆ = −  and DT k M n= - 2 ( ) , 
but the values of k1 and k2 will be very different 
for the two forces. The constants k1 and k2 can 
be referred to as kill rates or as the coefficients 
of combat effectiveness.
The battle was waged while the Mexi-
cans were in the open field. The effectiveness 
constant k2 was very much smaller than k1 
giving a kill advantage to the Texans. Once 
the Alamo walls were breached, the values of 
the kill coefficients, k1 and k2, probably were 
vastly altered, and the battle ended is very 
short time. We model this battle as if it were 
a fight to the finish. According to historical 
evidence, the battle of the Alamo lasted for one 
hour once the siege started. Every Texan was 
killed at the Alamo and estimates vary for the 
number of Mexican’s killed from 800 to 1500 
of the Mexican force of approximately 3000 
soldiers. We assume in our model that about 
1300 Mexican’s were killed in the battle. We 
calculate the kill coefficients for our model of 
combat where these numbers represent kills 
per minute by each side. Through modeling 
experimentation with the force sizes and length 
of the battle, we estimated the kill coefficients 
to be: k1 = 0.25 and k2= 0.00145.
The situation at the Alamo, as described 























































From our equation k k T k M1 2 0 1 0× < ×  
we have 0.019039 (189) < 0.25(3000). Since 
3.598 < 750, we know that the Mexican army 
wins decisively. In Table 1, we obtained the 
values to achieve parity so that we can see if 
under what circumstances the Texans could 
have won. We can easily see that many of these 
values are unrealistic for the event. Under par-
ity we can hold three of the four parameters as 
constants and vary the fourth parameter. Then 
it can be seen if the new value is feasible or 
not feasible.
From Table 1, we find the Texans would 
have to improve their ability to kill the attacking 
Mexicans by 146.13%. According to Thompson 
(1989), the Texans already had rifles with a 
longer range by 200 meters, thus it might not 
be feasible to improve their killing coefficient 
by over 146%. The Texans were already inside 
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the Alamo, thus lowering the kill rate of the 
Mexicans by over 68% may not feasible either. 
The force size suggests that under these battle 
conditions set forth in the siege that over 229 
or an increase of men of over 21% would be 
enough to get a draw. However, when the walls 
of the Alamo are breached by the Mexican army 
we would need to recalculate the results with 
different models.
THE BaTTlE OF TRaFalGaR
Another historic example of the directed fire 
model of combat is the Battle of Trafalgar. 
Trautteur and Virgilio (2003), Giordano, 
Fox, Horton, and Weir (2009), Giordano and 
McCormick (2007), Cummings (2001), Fox 
(2008b), and Kingman (2002) each discussed 
the applications of Lanchester’s equations to 
this battle. In classical naval warfare, two fleets 
would sail parallel to each other (see Figure 
6) and fire broadside at one another until one 
fleet was annihilated or gave up. The white 
fleet represents the British and the black fleet 
represents the French-Spanish fleet.
In such an engagement, the fleet with supe-
rior firepower will inevitably win. To model this 
battle, we begin with the system of difference 
equations that models the interaction of two 
fleets in combat. Suppose we have two oppos-
ing forces with A0  and B0  ships initially, and 
A t( )  and B t( )  ships t units of time after the 
battle is engaged. Given the style of combat at 
the time of Trafalgar, the losses for each fleet 
will be proportional to the effective firepower 
of the opposing fleet. That is,
DA k B= -
1
 and  2B k A∆ = − , 
where k1 and k2 are positive constants that mea-
sure the effectiveness of the ship’s cannonry 
and personnel and A and B are both functions 
of time. In preparing for the Battle at Trafalgar, 
Admiral Nelson assumed the coefficients of ef-
fectiveness of the two fleets were approximately 
equal. To keep things simple initially, we let 
k k
1 2
0 05= = . . The figure and numerical 
listing below allows us to look at many different 
initial settings and try to ascertain a pattern in 
the results of the battles.
We iterate these dynamical systems equa-
tions to obtain the numbers in the table to deter-
mine who wins the engagement. We graph this 
information as illustrated in Figure 7.
In this example, Admiral Nelson has 27 
ships while the allied French and Spanish 
fleet had 33 ships. As we can see in Table 2, 
Admiral Nelson is expected to lose all 27 of 
his ships while the allied fleet will lose only 
about 14 ships.




Since k k FS k B1 2 0 1 0× > ×  then the 
French-Spanish Fleet win. The analytical solu-
tion can be easily developed as:
Figure 6. The white fleet (British) is outnumbered by the black fleet (French and Spanish fleet)
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For the British to win, we first find the 
values that provide them with a draw. We find 
the British would require 33 ships to have draw. 
Additionally, we find that the British would have 
to increase their kill effectiveness to 0.07469 
to obtain a draw. Increases just beyond these 
values, give the British the theoretical edge. 
However, there were no more ships or arma-
ments to use in the battle. The only option to 
alter the outcome would be a change in strategy. 
According to history, Admiral Nelson defied 
conventional warfare, ordered his captains to 
split the British fleet and spear the enemy’s 
line, called “crossing the T,” to create a “pell-
mell battle,” which has been called the “Nelson 
Touch.”
We can test this new strategy that was used 
by Admiral Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar 
using our discrete combat model. Admiral 
Nelson decided to move away from the course 
of linear battle of the day and use a “divide and 
conquer” strategy. Nelson decided to break his 
fleet into two groups of size 13 and size 14. He 
also divided the enemy fleet into three groups: 
a force of 17 ships (called B), a force of 3 ships 
(called A) and a force of 13 ships (called C). 
We can assume these as the head, middle, and 
tail of the enemy fleet. His plan was to take the 
13 ships and attack the middle 3 ships. Then 
have his reserve 14 ships rejoin the attack and 
attack the larger force B, and then turn to at-
tack the smaller force C. How did Nelson’s 
strategy prevail?
Assuming all other variables remain con-
stant other than the order of the attacks against 
the differing size forces, we find the Admiral 
Nelson and the British fleet now win the battle 
sinking all French-Spanish ships with the British 
fleet having 13 or 14 ships remaining.
How did we obtain these results? The 
easiest method was by iteration. We used three 
battle formulas. We stop each battle when one 
of the values gets close to zero (before going 
negative). This is displayed in Figure 8.
Figure 7. Battle of Trafalgar under normal battle strategies showing the victory of the French-
Spanish fleet
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DETERMINING THE 
lENGTH OF THE BaTTlE
To determine the length of the battle, we can 
use our analytical solutions to solve for the ap-
propriate time. Recall the solution to our Blue 
versus Red example:
X t t( ) .
.





1 0707 83 36
1
0 707
( . )0 9293 t. 
This simplifies to


























( . )0 9293 t
 
The graph in Figure 2 showed that x wins (as 
did our other analysis), thus the time parame-
ter we are interested in finding is “when does 
y go o zero?” If you try to use the x equation, 
we would end up with trying to take the ln of 
a negative number, which is not possible.
We use only the solution to y(t):
y t t t( ) . . . .= - × + ×10 35 1 0707 58 9355 0 9293  
and set y(k)=0.


























12 28  time periods. 
In general, the time parameter is either of 















































depending on which form yields the ln (positive 
number) in the numerator.
If our Red-Blue combat data was in kills/
hour, then the battle lasted for 12.28 hours. 
Often we are interested in the approximate time 
or length of the battle. These two formulas in 
equation (11) allow for a quick computation 
for time.
Figure 8. British prevail with Nelson’s new strategy
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BaTTlE OF IwO 
JIMa EXaMPlE
The Battle of Iwo Jima has been studied as 
another historic example as a Lanchester’s 
differential equation by Engel (1954) and 
Hercilla-Heredia (2008b). At Iwo Jima dur-
ing WWII, the Japanese had 21,500 soldiers 
and the United States had 73,000 soldiers. We 
assume that all forces were initially in place. 
The combatants engaged in conventional direct 
warfare, but the Japanese were fighting from 
reinforced entrenchments. The coefficient of 
effectiveness for the Japanese was assumed to be 
0.0544 while that of the U.S. side was assumed 
to be 0.0106 (based on data after the battle). If 
these values are approximately correct, which 
side should win? How many should remain on 
the winning side when the other side has only 
1500 remaining?
We can move directly to the parity condi-
tions and the analytical solution to answer these 
questions. First, we use our parity equations:
k k x k y















We find that k k x1 2 0 = 0.02401 (73,000) 
and k y
1 0
= (0.0106) (21,500). Since 1752.97 
> 227.90,we know that the United States wins 
decisively.
The analytical solution is:
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We solve the equation for the time it takes for 
the Japanese force to attrite to 1,500 soldiers. 
We find it takes 30.922 periods for the Japanese 
to reach 1,500 soldiers. At that time, the model 
shows that United States had approximately 
53,999 soldiers remaining.
The battle actually ended with 1500 Japa-
nese survivors and 44,314 U.S. survivors and 
took approximately 33 or 34 days. Our model’s 
approximations are off by about 6% in the length 
of the battle and by 21.8% in the number of 
surviving U.S. soldiers. The error in surviving 
soldiers could cause us to revisit the model’s 
assumptions for the explanation. The United 
States actually used a phased landing over 15 
days of actual combat to reach their final force 
of 73,000 soldiers. If we model this in a fashion 
similar to how we did the Battle of Trafalgar with 
the new strategy and phase in the reinforcements 
due to the landing over the 15 days, we obtain a 
slightly more accurate depiction of the action. 
This solution is strictly done numerically and 
is illustrated in Figure 9.
Under these phased landings, the model 
shows improved accuracy. The models shows 
that the United States wins in 32 days (un-
derestimated by 3%) and the final U.S. troop 




Today’s warfare is considered to be different in 
that forces from one side are combating insur-
gents or terrorist factions. According to Pow-
ers (2008), Giordano, Fox, Horton, and Weir 
(2009), and Giordano and McCormick (2007), 
the dynamics of today’s battlefield are quite dif-
ferent but still can be modeled by Lanchester’s 
equations. Consider the later stages of the war 
in Iraq that has become a multi-ring conflict, 
according to Kilcullen (2007) and Fox (2008a), 
as portrayed in Figure 10. Fox (2008a) used 
dynamical systems to model this conflict.
Insurgency and counter-insurgency opera-
tions can be modeled in a simplified sense using 
a discrete Lanchester’s equation model that was 
modified by Brackney (1959) in Brackney’s 
Mixed Law (also called the Parabolic Law). 
The Brackney model can be used to repre-
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sent Guerilla warfare and can also be used to 
represent insurgency and counter-insurgency 
operations.
We define Y(n) to be the insurgent strength 
after period n. and we define X(n) to be the 
government troop strength after period n.
Then we develop the discrete form as,
X(n+1)=X(n)-k1*X(n)*Y(n)  (12) 
Y(n+1)=Y(n)-k2*X(n)where k1 and k2 are kill 
rates.
Models of this form have been used to 
model modern guerilla warfare according to 
Deitchman (1962), Schaffer (1968, 2007), 
Fowler (2006), and Giordano and McCormick 
(2007). In the later stages of the Vietnam War, 
General William Westmoreland requested an 
increase in the U.S. troop strength of 206,000 
to obtain victory. According to Secretary of 
Defense McNarmara (1968) in a memorandum 
to President Johnson, he concluded that the 
requested force increase would not be sufficient 
for a U.S. victory. President Johnson later re-
jected Westmoreland’s request that eventually 
led to the American disengagement in 1973. 
Perhaps the reason for turning down the troop 
increase was based on analysis that showed over 
a million more U.S. soldiers would be needed 
to insure victory.
Let us assume the Viet Cong, X(n), used 
guerilla warfare and the United States, Y(n), used 
conventional techniques. The combat might be 
models used Brackney’s form:
X(n+1) = X(n)-k1 *X(n)*Y (n)
Y(n+1)=Y(n)-k2*X(n)where k1 and k2 are   
respective kill rates.
In a fair fight, each the two forces reach 0 
at the same time, thus we can infer conditions 
for a fair fight from these equations.








=            (13)







was estimated after the Tet offensive in 1968 as 
1
1000 , so Y X0 01000=  at parity. This means 
Figure 9. The Battle of Iwo Jima with the phased landings
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that group of X
0
10=  guerillas could be effec-
tive against a force 10 times their size fighting 
a conventional battle (Braun, 1983; Borrelli & 
Coleman, 1998; Coleman, 1983).
The consequence of having small guerilla 
units (X0) in Vietnam is that the total armed 
forces of the United States and South Vietnam-
ese combined needed to be about 10 times that 
of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese for the 
United States and South Vietnamese to have a 
reasonable chance of victory. In 1968, the ratio 
of forces was at 6 to 1. General Westmoreland 
asked for an additional 206,000 troops, but 
this request was rejected by President Johnson. 
Would the additional troops have turned the 
tide of the war?
In 1968, there were 280,000 guerilla forces 
of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regu-
lars and 1,680,000 forces of the United States 
(510,000), its allies (70,000) and South Vietnam-
ese soldiers (1,100,000). The ratio of troops at 







With the additional 206,000 US 







.» . This was not nearly enough 
 
to affect the outcome of the conflict. To truly 
be productive, the United States needed to 
increase its troop level from 510,000 to more 
than 1,120,000. Clearly, this was an impossible 
number.
Schaffer (2007) states that modern, 21st 
century, terrorist-inspired insurgencies are 
comparable to the Vietnam experience and can 
be modeled using Lanchester’s equations. It has 
been pointed out by Schaffer (2007) as well as 
other documents that the North Vietnamese force 
size never exceeded approximately 250,000, yet 
over time they received over 660,000 casual-
ties. This suggests a different model form that 
allows for growth of the insurgency as well as 
attrition by combat. We examined the work of 
Giordano and McCormick (2007) that models 
the total conflict using insurgent and govern-
ment growth as well as attrition. We modified 
the model as a discrete set of equations:
X n X n a L X n X n k X n Y n
Y n Y n b L
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) (
+ = + × - × - × ×





- × - ×Y n Y n k X n( )) ( ) ( )
2  
 (14)
Figure 10. View of the strategic problems in Iraq
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where k1 and k2 are kill rates, a, b are positive 
growth constants, and L1 and L2 are carrying 
capacities.
This model is a combination of both a 
growth model and a combat model and repre-
sents when conflict is on-going and growth is 
still part of the insurgency operation. This sys-
tem of equations can only be solved numerically 
and then analyzed using numerical iteration 
and graphs. Having laptops with Excel enable 
soldiers and decision makers to characterize 
these situations and get quick “results” that 
they can interpret.
Consider the activities currently on going 
in Afghanistan. The Taliban is gaining strength 
recruiting from both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The U.S. forces only grows by a surge in force 
size that we assume is not forthcoming. Assume 
we have the following model for the effective-
ness of the fighting forces.
Let x(n) be the Taliban and y(n) be the 
U.S. forces.
This nonlinear model might be normalized 
and then simplified as follows:
x n x n x n x n x n y n
y n y n
( ) ( ) . ( ) ( ( )) . ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
+ = + × × - - × ×
+ = -
1 0 01 1 0 02
1 0. ( )001 × x n  
 (15)
In this nonlinear model, we assume the U.S. 
forces have not received their surge and that the 
size of the Taliban is initially slightly larger than 
the U.S. ground force size. In this unclassified 
example for analysis, we see that over time the 
United States will eventually prevail. Figure 
11 provides the insights that the United States 
prevails over the Taliban insurgents.
COMPaRISON TO STaNDaRD 
laNCHESTER’S EqUaTIONS 
VIa DIFFERENTIal EqUaTIONS
Since we have suggested using the discrete 
form of Lanchester’s equations instead of the 
differential equation form, let’s see how well 
they compare. Let us revisit the Red and Blue 
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This system of differential equations 
yields the solution accurate to three decimals 
places:
x t e e
y t e




= × + ×
= - ×
× - ×14 644 85 355
10 355
0 0707 0 707
0 0707× - ×+ ×t te60 355 0 707. .  
We provide a plot of the solutions of the 
differential equations and the solutions by our 
discrete model using difference equations in 
Figure 12. Note how close they align.
CONClUSION
The use of difference equations in combat 
modeling has practical value. Not only do 
analytical solutions allow analysts to provide 
decision makers with quantitative information 
to quickly analyze potential results but every 
difference equation has a numerical solution 
that can be achieved easily. For the decision 
maker in the field a differential equation is an 
abstract concept and the tools for analysis are 
not available to the commander in the field. 
However, an Excel spreadsheet is a powerful 
tool for decision makers in that it is available in 
the field. The systems of difference equations 
based upon “Future=Present + Change” is 
an intuitive, non-evasive approach for which 
every combat model has a numerical solution 
and some combat models such as the direct fire 
models have analytical solutions that directly 
lend themselves to analysis and results. The 
modern combat scenario of terrorist using in-
surgency tactics, lends itself to more nonlinear 
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models of combat that are more easily analyzed 
using the numerical and graphical solutions of 
a difference equation. We are currently teach-
ing this methodology and these models to our 
military students in our modeling courses in 
the Defense Analysis department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.
Figure 11. The war in Afghanistan showing the United States prevailing over time
Figure 12. Solution plots of Blue versus Red forces via differential equations and difference 
equations showing graphically that they are practically the same
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